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should include virus culture. Physi-
cians should be aware of the limita-
tions of laboratory diagnostic assays 
for LASV.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Skunks, 
Canada 
To the Editor: In March 2009, 
a novel inﬂ   uenza virus A (H1N1) 
emerged in Mexico, and, because of 
widespread human-to-human transmis-
sion, a global pandemic was declared 
in June 2009 (1). Although most cas-
es have involved humans, pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 has sporadically infected 
swine and turkeys and has also been 
reported in a small number of pet fer-
rets, cats, and captive cheetahs, and in 
a dog (2). Many of these animals were 
cared for by persons who experienced 
inﬂ   uenza-like illness and the owner 
of 1 cat who died had conﬁ  rmed pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 respiratory disease 
before the cat became ill, which sug-
gests probable human-to animal-trans-
mission of the virus (2).
During mid-December 2009–mid-
January 2010, eight striped skunks 
(Mephitis mephitis) died on a mink 
farm near Vancouver, British Colum-
bia, Canada. On January 12, 2010, 
two of the skunks were brought to the 
Animal Health Centre in Abbotsford, 
British Columbia, for postmortem ex-
amination. One skunk exhibited pu-
rulent nasal exudates. In both skunks, 
investigators observed splenomegaly 
and severe pneumonia, character-
ized by heavy, dark red to purple, 
lung lobes involving >70% of the 
lung  ﬁ   eld. Microscopic examination 
showed moderate rhinitis and severe 
bronchopneumonia with intralesional 
bacteria, areas of interstitial pneumo-
nia, and occasional nematode larvae. 
Also observed were splenic extramed-
ullary hematopoiesis, plasmacytosis 
of both lymph nodes and spleen, and 
mild plasmacytic glomerulonephritis 
with proteinuria.
Routine bacteriologic culture of 
lung showed heavy growth of Strep-
tococcus dysgaslactiae subsp. equi-
similis,  Staphylococcus aureus, and 
Hafnia alvei. That death was caused 
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by uncomplicated mixed bacterial 
bronchopneumonia in 2 (and possibly 
up to 8) adult skunks over a 6-week 
period was considered unlikely. The 
presence of lungworm was considered 
incidental. However, the areas of in-
terstitial pneumonia suggested that a 
primary viral pathogen was likely.
Molecular testing was conducted 
initially on fresh lung, liver, kidney, 
and spleen for canine distemper vi-
rus and, subsequently, for inﬂ  uenza 
A virus. The splenic and nodal plas-
macytosis and plasmacytic glomeru-
lonephritis also prompted testing for 
Aleutian disease virus (ADV). Organ 
samples were negative for canine dis-
temper virus and positive for ADV.
Detection of inﬂ  uenza  A  virus 
nucleoprotein and matrix genes and he-
magglutinin and neuraminidase typing 
was performed with real-time reverse 
transcription–PCR. Organ samples 
were positive for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, which was conﬁ   rmed by se-
quence analysis of DNA fragments ob-
tained in the hemagglutinin, neuramin-
idase, and matrix gene testing.
Primary viral interstitial pneu-
monia is frequently complicated by 
opportunistic bacterial bronchopneu-
monia and inﬂ  uenza virus A infection 
has been shown to predispose to pul-
monary bacterial toxicity (3). Thus, 
we concluded that primary pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 interstitial pneumonia 
had predisposed the 2 skunks to mixed 
bacterial bronchopneumonia and 
death. The skunks were also infected 
with ADV, presumably as a result of 
viral shedding by the minks, which 
are known to be ADV carriers. Striped 
skunks can be experimentally infected 
with ADV, and antibodies to ADV 
have been detected in wild skunks (4). 
Although ADV does not cause pneu-
monia (4), co-infection with ADV and 
inﬂ   uenza A virus is associated with 
higher mortality rates in minks with 
respiratory disease (5). Thus, ADV 
co-infection may have contributed to 
the severity of the pneumonia and the 
death of the skunks.
The source of the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus is unclear. Nasal 
discharge was also observed in many 
of the minks, which suggests that they 
had a respiratory viral infection. How-
ever, no diagnostic workup was under-
taken. Although severe outbreaks of 
interstitial pneumonia on mink farms 
can occur (6), most natural inﬂ  uenza 
A virus infections in minks are either 
mild or asymptomatic (5). Thus, the 
minks may also have been infected 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Many 
of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tions reported in animals are believed 
to have been the result of exposure to 
infected humans (2). Workers on the 
mink farm did not experience inﬂ  uen-
za-like illness. However, humans with 
asymptomatic pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
infection may have transmitted it to 
the mink. Because the skunks visited 
the mink farm daily, transmission of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from humans 
to minks to skunks is a possibility.
In view of the detection of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 virus in 2 striped 
skunks with fatal pneumonia, this 
species should now be regarded as 
a potential source of inﬂ  uenza A vi-
rus. Wild animals participate in the 
transmission of inﬂ  uenza A  viruses 
between species, and the presence 
of wildlife on farms is known to be 
a risk factor for infection of poultry 
(7). Similar to raccoons, skunks ex-
press both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acid 
receptors for avian and human inﬂ  u-
enza viruses in the respiratory tract 
(M. Shrenzel, San Diego Zoo, pers. 
comm.), which is believed to create 
the opportunity for mixed inﬂ  uenza 
infections with potential for genetic 
reassortment (8). Skunks, like rac-
coons, are highly mobile animals with 
large home ranges in rural and urban 
areas, which provides numerous op-
portunities for inﬂ  uenza A virus ex-
posure and transmission to poultry, 
livestock, pets, and, ultimately, hu-
mans. The inclusion of striped skunks 
in wildlife inﬂ  uenza surveillance pro-
grams may be warranted. 
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Community-
acquired 
Oseltamivir-
Resistant Pandemic
 (H1N1) 2009 in 
Child, Israel
To the Editor: During the spring 
of 2009, a pandemic inﬂ  uenza  A 
(H1N1) virus emerged and spread 
globally. Initial testing of the virus 
found it susceptible to neuraminidase 
inhibitors and resistant to adamantanes 
(1,2). As of March 5, 2010, only 264 
cases of oseltamivir-resistant pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 infection had been re-
ported to the World Health Organiza-
tion, but the number of cases has been 
steadily increasing (2). These viruses 
were carrying the H275Y mutation, 
which conferred resistance to oselta-
mivir (2). Most of the reported cases 
were in immunocompromised patients 
who had prolonged viral shedding or 
in patients who had received oseltami-
vir prophylaxis or treatment (1–4). We 
describe an otherwise healthy 2-year-
old boy with oseltamivir-resistant pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 infection and a 
traumatic lung contusion, complicated 
by acute respiratory distress syndrome 
(ARDS). He had not received prior 
chemoprophylaxis or treatment with 
oseltamivir.
In November 2009, a healthy 
2-year-old boy was admitted to the 
pediatric intensive care unit at the 
Western Galilee Hospital in Nahariya, 
Israel, after he had been hit by a car. 
One day before the accident, he had 
exhibited fever and cough (for which 
he was treated with acetaminophen). 
His 4-year-old brother had recovered 
recently from an inﬂ  uenza-like illness 
without antiviral treatment. The other 
household contacts were his parents, 
who did not have a respiratory illness.
On admission, small, bilateral 
lung contusions, right pneumothorax, 
and liver lacerations were shown on 
computed tomographic scan. The pa-
tient was treated with a chest tube for 
drainage, supplemental oxygen, and 
oseltamivir from hospital day 1 (30 
mg 2 ×/day; child’s body weight = 13 
kg) and was placed in droplet isola-
tion. Respiratory swab specimens, ob-
tained on hospital day 1, were sent to 
the Israel Central Virology Laboratory 
(ICVL) and found to be positive for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by real-time 
reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR). 
On hospital day 3, the child was intu-
bated because of worsening respira-
tory distress and hypoxemia, and he 
required a second chest tube drain. 
His chest ﬁ  lm showed bilateral pulmo-
nary inﬁ  ltrates. His condition was then 
treated with nitric oxide, dopamine, 
and milrinone for ARDS and failure of 
the right side of the heart. The dosage 
of oseltamivir was doubled on hospi-
tal day 4 because of gastric residuals. 
Antimicrobial drug therapy with van-
comycin and piperacillin-tazobactam 
was added because sepsis and sec-
ondary bacterial lung infection were 
suspected. Because of the severity of 
his symptoms and persistence of fe-
ver, additional lower and upper airway 
specimens were sent to ICVL on hos-
pital days 5 and 10; they were positive 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
After these results were received, 
oseltamivir resistance was suspected, 
and his respiratory specimens were 
also checked by ICVL. A mixture of 
both wild-type and mutant pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 was found in the speci-
mens from hospital days 1, 5, and 10 
by an in-house q-RT-PCR assay de-
signed to detect the H275Y mutation 
(4,5). Further testing by sequence 
analysis of the neuraminidase gene 
showed a mixed population of wild-
type and mutant  pandemic (H1N1) 
2009; the mutant virus was carrying 
the histidine-to-tyrosine substitution 
at position 275, which conferred the 
quantitative RT-PCR result and the 
H275Y phenotype of oseltamivir-
resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009. By 
the time these laboratory results were 
known, the patient’s respiratory con-
dition was improving without chang-
ing the oseltamivir therapy. Cultures 
of blood and endotracheal specimens 
were sterile and antimicrobial drug 
therapy was stopped. On hospital day 
15, he was extubated, oseltamivir ther-
apy was ended, and he was weaned off 
oxygen a few days later. The respira-
tory specimen on hospital day 20 was 
negative for pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
No secondary inﬂ  uenza cases were de-
tected among healthcare personnel or 
patients in the unit.
In Israel, oseltamivir resistance 
has been detected by ICVL in 6 cases 
(5). The fact that our patient had os-
eltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 without a previous oseltamivir 
exposure is surprising because almost 
all cases of oseltamivir-resistance 
have been associated with previous 
oseltamivir prophylaxis or therapy and 
with prolonged viral shedding (which 
is often combined with oseltamivir 
therapy) in immunocompromised pa-
tients (1–5). Our patient did not at-
tend daycare and his parents had not 
been ill recently. Therefore, he likely 
was infected by his older brother who 
probably had pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
but was neither diagnosed nor treated 
with antiviral medications. This theory 
suggests that oseltamivir-resistant vi-
ruses circulate in the community with 
the potential to be transmitted between 
persons. 
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